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European monetary integration has come a long way since the establishment of
the Rome Treaty in 1957. Subject to this paper is the influence of the German
unification on the establishment of EMU. Key-literature on the subject varies a
great deal in perspective. Some claim that EMU is the direct result of national
political-economic preferences, while others argue that without the prospect of
German unification there would have been no such thing as a European monetary
union.  Most  authors  seem determined in  taking  one  particular  point  of  view,
favoring either national political-economic or geopolitical preferences. 
On the basis of two hypotheses, a study of key-scientific publications (Moravcsik,
1998; Staal, 1999; Baun, 1995 and Sandholtz, 1993) and a situational analysis
involving  the  EMS  period,  the  EMU  negotiation  process  and  the  period  after
Maastricht, this paper discusses the probability if the negotiations on EMU would
have reached a deadlock without the prospect of German unification or if EMU
would have been established also without this prospect,  while it  was a direct
result of Franco-German national political-economic considerations. 
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1. Introduction
European monetary integration has come a long way since the establishment of
the Rome Treaty in 1957. Via the Werner Report in 1970, the establishment of the
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 and the Delors Report in 1989 to the
1992  Maastricht  Treaty  including  the  three  stages  towards  the  European
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. However the current economic crisis, by some
referred  to  as  the  sovereign  debt  crisis,  put  a  hold  on  these  promising
developments. The trust in EMU in its current form and the interrelated Euro has
vanished altogether. Today the EU finds itself at the start of a new era of fiscal
integration:  the ‘European Banking Union’  as laid down in the Fiscal  Compact
entered into  force at  January  1st 2013. The time has  come for  the Euro-area
member states to, once again, hand over a part of their fiscal sovereignty to
Brussels. These recent developments have put the topic of monetary integration
back  into  the  limelight;  especially  the  discussion  about  the  dynamics  behind
European monetary integration blazed up again. Articles in newspapers like NRC
Handelsblad (October 29th — 30th 2011) and Der Spiegel (Vol. 30, 2010) prove that
the European media is still very much into the subject. 
One important aspect of the discussion is the one about the influence the 1989
German  Unification  had  on  the  Maastricht  negotiations  leading  to  EMU.
Discrepancies  can  be  found  in  key  literature  regarding  this  subject  while  its
authors vary a great deal in opinion. Some claim that the German Unification had
no influence on the Maastricht negotiations and EMU (Moravcsik,  1998;  Staal,
1999) while others argue that the German Unification left a significant mark on
the Maastricht negotiations and EMU. Some even claim that EMU probably would
not exist today if it wasn’t for the German unification (Baun, 1995; Sandholtz,
1993). These varying opinions offered me the incentive to dive into this subject to
figure  out  how  key  authors  interpret  the  significance  of  the  1989  German
Unification, on which grounds their opinions defer and how this relates to the
situation practice. The following research question lies at the basis of this thesis:
“In  which  capacity  and  to  what  extend  has  the  1989  German  Unification
influenced the Maastricht negotiations up till the establishment of EMU in 1999?” 
5 5
The  research  question  will  be  tested  on  the  basis  of  the  significance  of  two
hypotheses:
1. EMU would have been established without the prospect of German unification
while the establishment of EMU solely depended on national political-economic
preferences.
2.  The  establishment  of  EMU  would  have  reached  a  deadlock  without  the
prospect of German unification.
The significance of the hypotheses will  be tested making use of  a qualitative
literature study.  This thesis focuses solely on the German and French incentives
while these countries are claimed to be the most important actors during the
Maastricht negotiations towards EMU (Loedel, 1995; Feldstein 1997; Moravcsik,
1998). 
First some key scientific publications in the field of monetary integration will be
studied  and  compared  in  order  to  get  descent  insight  in  the  varying  views
regarding  the  capacity  and  extent  of  the  influence  of  the  1989  German
Unification on the Maastricht negotiations and the establishment of EMU. These
key  scientific  publications  cover  the  two  hypotheses  mentioned  before.
Subsequently  a  situational  analysis  will  be  conducted  in  order  to  test  the
relevance of the scientific publications and thus the hypotheses. The situational
analysis  consists  out of  three time-spans,  describing  ‘the road towards phase
one’ between 1979 and 1989, the 1989 negotiation period on phase two and
three and the period after the signing and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.
This analysis will be conducted on the basis of primary and secondary academic
sources like Community working papers and independent policy papers. While
the hypotheses cannot be proven, only falsified, the outcome of this research is
based solely on reasonable assumptions derived from the studied literature. 
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2. Study of key scientific publications 
This chapter includes a literature review on key papers concerning the incentives
that played a role in the establishment of EMU. Moravcsik (1998, pp. 386) and
Staal (1999, pp. 4) argue that the German unification had no influence on the
establishment  of  EMU  while  it  was  in  fact  the  product  of  national
political-economic preferences.  On the other hand, Sandholtz (pp. 1-41, 1993)
and Baun (pp. 606-614, 1995) argue that the German unification was crucial to
the establishment of EMU considering that the D-Mark was the price Germany
had to pay for its unification. 
2.1 Moravcsik: the Choice for Europe
Moravcsik’s  key-work  ‘The  Choice  for  Europe’  (1998)  is  often  referred  to  in
various position papers regarding the establishment of EMU, for example in Staal
(1999).  According  to  Moravcsik  the  five  main  steps  in  Europe’s  integration
process,  including  the  establishment  of  EMU,  were  driven  mainly  by  national
political-economic preferences while:
• European integration  was  the rational  answer  of  member  states  to  the
growing interdependence in world economics (pp. 3-6);
• Negotiations between member states are efficient (pp. 7);
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• Member  states  primarily  delegated  their  sovereignty  to  guard  the
credibility of their enclosed agreements (pp. 9).  
To  structure  his  theory  Moravcsik  refers  to  the  rationalist  framework  of
international cooperation (pp. 19-21). This framework proposes that international
negotiation  can  be  divided  into  three  stages:  national  preference  formation,
interstate bargaining and institutional  choice.  According to Moravcsik member
states’ preferences are no subject to changes during negotiations and thus they
are stable: “ The preferences are formed by national politics and thus they are
exogenous compared to the negotiation process” (pp.  24,  25,  462).  With this
vision  Moravcsik  denies  the  integrated  dynamics  of  the  monetary  integration
process  and downsizes  the  general  accepted  version  that  geopolitical  factors
played an important role in the European monetary integration process. National
political-economic preferences shifted due to the weak position of the dollar and
its  influence  on  intra-European  exchange-rates  and  due  to  emerging
macroeconomic convergence, capital mobility and market-integration, not due to
the process of negotiation in the context of European monetary integration (pp.
401,  408-412).  Moravcsik  argues  that  the  German  and  French  urge  to  strive
towards EMU, and the pattern of disagreement between them, already existed
and stabilized in the late 1960’s, thus in advance of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and
continued to exist after the German Unification was completed in August 1990
(pp. 381, 397). The German political economic preferences for EMU were focused
on price stability, low inflation rates and economic convergence and based on the
domestic  compromise  between  the  German  government  and  businesses.  The
reason  for  peak  business  groups  in  Germany  to  support  further  monetary
integration was positive experience in the EMS. This positive atmosphere offered
the Kohl government the possibility to pursue its European Federalist ambitions
(pp. 389, 391-393). The Maastricht Treaty reflected the German preferences for
EMU and the collapse of the Berlin wall in November 1989 did not changed these
preferences.  According to Moravcsik (pp. 7) the role of the political bargaining
process  among France  and Germany contributed  immensely  to  the  monetary
integration  process. He  claims  that  the  negotiations  surrounding  Maastricht
pointed towards an intergovernmental way of bargaining, also called the ‘concept
of political linkage’. This means that “the outcome of the negotiations reflect the
relative intensity of national preferences in each area carried out by the most
interested governments and those that  intensely  seek agreement making the
largest concessions”. While Germany had the strongest status quo where it came
8 8
to  monetary  stability,  it  had the strongest  bargaining power.  In  exchange for
giving up its monetary autonomy, it was able to dictate the largest extent of the
negotiation outcomes. According to Moravcsik this proves his theory, in line with
the rationalist framework, that the Maastricht negotiations on the establishment
of EMU were primarily influenced by national political-economic preferences (pp.
389-396). The fact that Moravcsik avoids to explain the sudden shift in German
preference, concerning the transitional provisions of EMU, only one month after
the collapse of the Berlin wall was already considered remarkable by Van Riel
(1999, pp. 222). 
There can be considered more flaws in Moravcsik’s exogenous preferences theory
while emerging capital mobility and market-integration cannot be seen separate
from  the  European  integration  process.  In  defense  he  argues  that
market-integration  is  not  empirically  relevant  in  explaining  member  states’
preferences, there were no cases of spill-over in European integration and the
final step in monetary integration was convergence to a single currency which
was a exogenous factor; all rather weak claims, also according to Van Riel (1999,
pp. 224). Moravcsik also argues: “The primacy of economic interests does not
relegate geopolitical ideology to insignificance while taken by themselves, naked
economic  preferences  would  probably  have  led  to  a  highly  institutionalized
pan-European  monetary  stabilization  free  trade  area  with  flanking  policies  of
regulatory harmonization” (pp. 6, 153, 389, 396, 477). Claiming this, Moravcsik
acknowledges  the  fact  that  there  are  holes  in  his  argumentation.  However,
economic interests remain the primary factor in the five main steps of Europe’s
integration  process:  “When  one  factor  had  to  give  away,  it  tended  to  be
geopolitics. Economic interests, moreover, determined the circumstances under
which geopolitical  could influence policy.  Only  where economic interests  were
weak, diffuse, or indeterminate could national politicians indulge the temptation
to consider geopolitical goals” (pp. 7). According to Moravcsik Germany pursued
a  remarkably  stable  net  national  position  in  European  monetary  discussions
which is in line with the rationalist framework Moravcsik builds his theory upon
(pp.  23).  However,  were  Moravcsik  on  the  one  hand  treats  critics  of  the
Bundesbank as ‘objections from extreme elements on the spectrum of German
opinion’ (pp. 446-447) he also claims that ‘Kohl’s winset in European monetary
negotiations was limited by the Bundesbank’ (pp. 403-404, 478). In my opinion,
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and according to Van Riel these statements can be considered rather conflicting
(1999, pp. 223). 
2.2 Staal: the German Political-Economic Trilemma
Similar to Moravcsik (1998), Staal (1999) challenges the Unification imperative
(pp.  4).  “Standard  explanations  suggest  that  German  acceptance  of  EMU  is
attributed to an ‘unification imperative.’ My analysis challenges such claims. For
Germany, European monetary union is no mere diplomatic expedient that comes
at the cost of the national economic interest”. His main argumentation is that the
German unification can be deduced  to  a positive foreign policy externality (pp.
10-14). Similar to Moravcsik (1998), Staal refers to the fact that the discussion on
EMU had started before the collapse of the Berlin wall as a result of the flaws in
the EMS (pp. 8-9).  According to Staal,  already two decades in advance of the
1989 German Unification  German decision-makers  favored  monetary  union to
escape  a  ‘political-economic  trilemma’  deriving  from  the  reserve  currency
function of the Deutschmark within the EMS. Germany became a hegemon not by
design but default” (pp. 4-5). Germany’s hegemonic character undermined the
exchange  rate  cooperation  of  Germany’s  trading  partners  and  Kohl’s  policy
commitment  to  European  integration.  Kohl  believed  that  EMU  would  solve
Germany’s unfavorable position by exchanging the Deutschmark for a common
European currency. According to German economic policy EMU’s success required
solid guarantees of price stability. “Based on this analysis, the German position
on EMU was genuine determination to minimize the serious risks involved. The
logic  of  EMU  for  Germany  rested  on  a  solid  foreign  and  economic  policy
foundation” (pp. 5). Theodor Waigel, Germany’s minister of finance during the
negotiations, more or less confirms this theory. He stated: “Der Euro is genau im
vorgesehenen Zeitplan gekommen”.  According to Staal  (pp.  10)  there was no
French pressure on Germany to cooperate on EMU or to deepen the European
Community. On the contrary; German leaders were eager to demonstrate their
commitment to Europe. “Throughout the history of the Federal Republic the two
objectives of European integration and German unification had been two sides of
the same foreign policy. For Kohl political and monetary union were the logical
and desirable extension of earlier policies.’’ With this statement concerning the
important  role  of  spill-over  in  EMU  preferences,  Staal  differentiates  his
argumentation from Moravcsik’s. He argues that  “in the nineties the French and
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the  entire  European  Community  would  have  great  advantages  from  the
strengthened economic power of Germany” (pp. 10-11). Staal, correctly, refers to
the  fact  that  monetary  integration  was  already  in  progress  before  November
1989. According to Staal this occurred due to the political-economic trilemma in
the  EMS  and  due  to  spill-over  from  the  European  Single  Market  Act  (SEA),
indicating the importance of national  political-economic preferences.  However,
later on in his paper he refers to various geopolitical incentives at the time, which
damages the credibility of his argumentation concerning the unifications marginal
importance.  Staal argues: “By anchoring the unified Germany more firmly in the
European Community, EMU could address the French misgivings about German
unification.”  This  indicates  that  Germany  did  felt  French  pressure  in  EMU
negotiations   (pp.  14).   The  establishment  of  EMU  was  a  decisive  factor  in
Mitterrand’s agreement to German unification.  For Mitterrand,  ‘deepening’  the
European Community  was even meant  to  nurture German unity.  The ongoing
developments  within  Europe,  especially  with  regard  to  the  East,  would  bring
Europe closer to the day on which Germany could be reunified. I this light, for
both countries,  the establishment of EMU was a positive development for the
unification  eventuality  (pp.  8).  This  is  supported  by  Dyson  and  Featherstone
(1999, pp, 363-365). The Chancellory’s documentation shows the perception that
Mitterrand  supported  unification  as  early  as  July  1989  but  that  he  did  not
considered it as a short-term outcome until early 1990 (pp. 9). The accelerating
reality of German unification in early 1990 stimulated both France and Germany
to overcome their outstanding differences over implementing the final two stages
of the Delors plan and the necessary institutional reforms. These statements do
not implicate that the German unification was just a marginal positive externality.
On the contrary, they implicate that the German unification played a crucial role
in  the  process  of  EMU  negotiations  while  it  influenced  as  well  France  and
Germany  to  overcome  their  outstanding  differences  leading  to  accelerated
agreement. “But”,  Staal  claims,  “Both  the  German  and  French  governments
resolved to accelerate the European Political Union (EPU),  indicating that EMU
itself was not a quid pro quo for French acceptance of unification” (pp. 19). The
primary determinants of the German decision for EMU therefore must be found in
considerations relevant before unification. In my opinion Staal uses a very weak
argument to rest his case, while EPU was a German demand in order to gain
national public support for agreement upon EMU and eventually French support
for German unification. France in its turn only agreed upon the acceleration of
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EPU in order to gain German agreement on EMU’s irrevocability, indicating that
EMU indeed  was  a  quid  pro  quo  for  French  acceptance  of  unification.  In  my
opinion this endangers the credibility of Staal’s argumentation even further. The
creditability of Staal’s research gets further induced in his concluding remarks
while he, again, argues in favor of geopolitical importance: “Still, EMU undeniably
had  clear  positive  diplomatic  externalities  for  German  unification  and  the
accelerating reality of German unification in early 1990 gave additional impetus
to  both  France  and  Germany  to  overcome their  outstanding  differences  over
implementing the final two stages of the Delors plan” (pp. 9). 
2.3 Baun: The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics
Baun (1995) analyses the Maastricht Treaty on the basis of high (public safety
grounds)   and  low  (economic)  politics  which  is  also  argued  in  Dyson  and
Featherstone  (pp.  47,  1999).  He  argues  that  EMU  was  not  established  on
economic  grounds  but  that  it  was  a  French  political  response  to  German
unification and the end of the old war. “This political consideration would prove to
be the primary force behind new initiatives for European monetary union in the
late 1980’s” (pp. 606). However, according to Baun, ever since France was forced
to abandon its expansionary economic program in order to remain in the EMS, it
resented the German hegemonic position and its main objective was to establish
control  over  German  monetary  policy  through  the  creation  of  supranational
monetary institutions (pp. 608). With this statement Baun indicates that national
political-economic factors did play a role in the decision to put EMU back on the
European agenda. In January 1988 France made a renewed attempt at monetary
union with a proposal for the creation of a European central bank. The German
government  was  wary,  however,  it  allowed discussion  of  the  idea  mainly  for
political reasons and despite the strong opposition of its Bundesbank while the
developments in the East made the prospect of German unification more and
more likely in the relative short term. In April 1989, the Commission published the
Delors  Plan,  envisaging  a  three-stage  process  leading  to  full  monetary  and
currency union. At the Madrid summit of June 1989 national leaders endorsed the
content of the Delors Plan and approved the July 1990 date for beginning stage
one (pp. 608-609). The remaining steps for achieving economic and monetary
union were to be discussed at a special intergovernmental conference (IGC) for
which the starting-date would be decided upon at the December 1989 Strasbourg
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Council. However, the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 placed the issue of
monetary union in an entire new context. With the German unification knocking
at  their  front  door,  concern  about  the  power of  a  united Germany led  many
European leaders to support deepening of European integration in order to bind
Germany permanently to the Community. France would lose most from German
unification. Not only would a united Germany be larger than France, also the end
of the cold war would mean a removal of all international constraints on German
sovereignty   which  would  weaken the  French  position  compared to  Germany.
According to Baun “a shift from a security order dominated by military power to
an economic order would favor Germany over France. In order to retain some
influence and control over is powerful neighbor, France sought a deepening of EC
structures” (pp.  609-610).  Also Germany was in favor  of  EC deepening.  Even
though  this  found  its  basis  in  fundamental  national  economic  and  political
interests,  more  immediately  the  German  government  was  well  aware  of  the
suspicion and fear of its neighbors and was anxious to secure them. Kohl wanted
to show that German unification and European integration were not contradictory
but complementary and he was eager to safeguard a positive relationship with
France as the basis of Germany’s European policy. “For these reasons, he viewed
Germany’s agreement to further EC integration and in particular monetary union
as  the price  that  had to  be paid  for  gaining Europe’s  acceptance of  German
unification” (pp. 611). 
When Kohl  presented the Ten-point-plan for  German unification at  the end of
November 1989 most European leaders were afraid that their fears regarding an
independent  nationalistic  Germany  would  become  reality.  According  to  Baun,
Germany’s position on monetary union and especially transitional provisions for
EMU negotiations became an instrument in testing Germany’s commitment to the
Community and European integration. However, the Bundesbank and Germany’s
Finance Ministry argued that with the prospect of German unification the time
was not ripe to start EMU negotiations on stage two and three. They argued in
favor of more preparatory work and the completion of the SEA and the first stage
of  EMU. Also national  parties  in Germany were keen on delaying the process
while  they  were  afraid  the  EMU  issue  would  become  subject  to  domestic
elections. The German Foreign Minister Genscher on the other hand wanted to
set  firm  dates  for  further  monetary  integration  in  order  to  prevent  German
isolation  in  Europe  (612-613).  Where  Kohl  was  against  fixing  transitional
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provisions in the first place, he finally had no other choice then to agree upon the
French demand for an EMU conference in the second half of 1990, while France
accepted the German condition of delaying the EMU conference until after the
German elections in early December (pp. 613) This agreement was reached just a
few hours in advance of the Strasbourg summit. The EMU conference would be
formally  opened  at  the  EC  summit  scheduled  for  mid-December,  with  actual
negotiations beginning in early 1991. Like the French, the Germans were pleased
with  the  outcome  of  the   meeting,  which  Kohl  personally  described  as
‘extraordinary successful’ (pp. 613-614). 
Baun’s argumentation offers a detailed insight in the Franco-German negotiation
process,  correctly placing crucial importance on the unification imperative. He
states  that  the initial  choice for  EMU was based upon issues  of  high politics
regarding the French fear of the German unification. According to Baun this fear
was already present and understood by Germany in advance of the collapse of
the Berlin wall, leading to the publication of the Delors report in April 1989 and
creating an incentive for Germany to make the necessary concessions in order to
gain support for its unification. However, Baun does not place the right amount of
importance  on  the  national  political-economic  factors  that  contributed  to  the
initial Franco-German choice for EMU, while the issue of economic convergence
vs.  exchange-rate  stability  can  reasonably  be  assumed  one  of  the  key
Franco-German determents for moving to EMU in the first place, the reason for
the French irrevocability demand and the main reason for Germany’s reluctance
regarding  the  transitional  provisions.  In  my  opinion  this  argumentation-gap
damages the exhaustiveness and thus the credibility of Baun’s research.  
2.4. Sandholtz: Choosing union 
Sandholtz (1993) analyzed the motivations of the member states to participate in
EMU. He distinguishes multiple factors that contributed to this choice. However,
according  to  Sandholtz,  the  most  important  factor  to  enhance  European
monetary integration was the political aspect of tying the unified Germany to the
Community in order to prevent future aggression. Not only France regarded this
as  very  important,  also  Germany  was  willing  to  commit  itself  to  European
integration for its  own benefit.  Sandholtz  (1993) and Baun (1995) are  on the
same page while also Sandholtz  argues that  only the geopolitical  perspective
explains  German  support  for  EMU while  it  cannot  be  explained  on  economic
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grounds.  “Germany  was  the  only  country  that  gave  up  sovereignty  by
participating in EMU while all other European countries had already given up their
sovereignty by participating in the EMS since 1979”. In order to remain within the
EMS’ determined fluctuation band European member states had no other choice
than to fix their currency to the D-Mark which was the strongest currency in the
system. According to Sandholtz, EMU brought Germany no economic or monetary
benefits and therefore the prospect of German unification can be considered as
the most effective impulse  to the establishment of EMU (pp. 1-41). 
Sandholtz claims that EMU brought Germany no economic or monetary benefits.
This explanation however is far too simplistic. It is certainly true that Germany
favored the traditional economic approach and it can be considered assumable
that Germany agreed upon the ‘monetarist’  transitional  provisions in order to
gain support for its unification. Otherwise it would have fixed progress in EMU
entirely to the progress in economic convergence.  However, the content of EMU
was very German in nature, it contained initiatives for an independent central
bank, focus on price-stability and strict convergence-criteria on budget-discipline
and public debt. Therefore it cannot be argued that Germany gained no economic
or monetary benefits at all from the establishment of EMU. It can, at best, be
claimed  that  the  economic  and  monetary  outcomes  for  Germany   were
sub-optimal.
2.5 Evaluating key-literature
What  stands  out  in  the  examined  key-literature  is  that  none  of  the  authors
provides  a  complete  and  objective  account  of  events.  The  authors  seem
determined  in  taking  one  particular  point  of  view  in  favoring  either  national
political-economic preferences or geopolitical ideology. They do not place a value
judgment on the Franco-German motives and the interlinked cause of events.
This offers an incomplete image of the establishment of EMU in general and the
correlation of economic and geopolitical interests in particular.  While the authors
insist  on  focusing  on  one  particular  perspective,  they  intent  to  deduce  the
importance of other important events which do not support their argumentation.
Also,  they  tend  to  produce  argumentations  which  are  contradictory  to  the
subsequent situational analysis. In my opinion this results in explanations which
are incomplete and only partly credible. The interaction between economic and
15 15
geopolitical incentives shall be described objectively in the following chapter. This
chapter  describes  in  which  way  national  political-economic  and  geopolitical
incentives influence each other and succeed each other in terms of dominance
during;  the  ‘road  towards  phase  one’  between  1979  and  1989,  the  1989
negotiation period on phase two and three and the period after the signing and
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.  
3. Situational analysis
3.1 The road to EMU
Moravcsik (1998, pp. 24, 25, 462) suggests that the German unification had no or
mostly marginal influence on EMU negotiations while the process towards EMU
depended on national  political-economic preferences which have not changed
during the EMU negotiation process. The latter part of this argumentation can be
related to the period up till  the collapse of the Berlin wall  in November 1989.
During the ERM period the Deutschmark was undervalued compared to the other
European  member  states  and  the  US,  this  can  be  proven  by  the  fact  that
Germany maintained a continuing balance of payments surplus. “The averaging
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of hard and soft currencies within the ERM has facilitated the undervaluation of
the Deutschmark” (Nobay, pp. 11-16, 2011). Also, under the ERM Germany had
to cope with a higher inflation rate than would have been the case without the
ERM. Its monetary policy has been the dominant but not the only considerable
force within the ERM. As a result, Germany’s preference for price stability could
not be achieved within the EMS (Nobay, pp. 11-16, 2011). “Since the late 1960’s
Germany has faced three undesirable options: uncompetitive exports, domestic
inflation,  or  regional  monetary  hegemony,  also  referred  to  as  the
‘political-economic  trilemma’.  German  export  competitiveness  depended  on
European exchange rate stability, the satisfaction of which meant that Germany
either  import  inflation  from  its  European  trading  partners  or  export  higher
interest rates abroad (Staal, pp. 4,1999). Institutionally and politically averse to
inflation,  Germany’s  hegemonic  character  undermined  the  exchange  rate
cooperation  of  Germany’s  trading  partners  and  Kohl’s  policy  commitment  to
European integration. Kohl believed that EMU would solve Germany’s unfavorable
position  by  exchanging  the  Deutschmark  for  a  common  European  currency.
According to German economic policy EMU’s success required solid guarantees of
price  stability  (Moravcsik,  1998;  Staal,  1999).  Feldstein  (pp,  9-14,  1997)  also
refers to the German political-economic trilemma. He states that Germany, by
agreeing upon EMU, hoped to dominate European monetary policy and create
fiscal  discipline among the Union.  As Kohl  frequently stated:  "Germany is  our
fatherland  but  Europe  is our  future."  The  German  whish  of  a  unified  Europe
dominated by  Germany strongly  conflicted with  the French  political  economic
incentive for monetary equality.  According to Maes (pp. 18-26, 2002), Germany
traditionally favored the coordination of economic policies and supported a long
convergence process to favor an alignment of monetary policies. For Germany,
and especially the Bundesbank, the convergence of economic performances was
a precondition for EMU. While convergence needed to be attained first, EMU was
a step that could be taken only in the far future. The EMU partner countries first
needed to implement the German financial-economic best practices before EMU
could start. (Segers and Van Riel, 2012). The German opinion conflicted with the
traditional  French  political  economic  ‘monetarist  view’.  The  French  were
traditionally in favor of plans for greater exchange rate stability and exchange
rate support mechanisms. “Monetary integration could have a driving role in the
convergence  process.  The  credibility  of  the  new  ECB  will  shape  future
expectations while past expectations become irrelevant. Such a bank can secure
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low inflation in all countries, even in those with a track record of higher inflation.
The emphasis is then on institution building, while disinflation processes could
otherwise be lengthy and costly” (Maes, pp. 11-16, 2002; Maes, 2007). 
Ever  since  the  1960’s  France  perceived  EMU as  being  the  means  to  greater
economic independence from the USA and to rebalance international monetary
power between Europe and the USA, this influenced French negotiation positions
on EMU in an important way (Dyson and Featherstone, pp. 97, 1999). This was
also the case for the French reluctance against the German hegemonic power in
monetary affairs, the asymmetric functioning of the snake in the 1970’s left a big
mark on the French position in EMU negotiations, There was a broad underlying
consensus that the priority of EMU should lie in fighting asymmetry.  Via EMU
France wished to regain some influence over monetary policy both in Europe and
globally. French interests on national, European and global level were defined in
terms of a new scope for political leadership of economic and monetary policy
consistent with the republican tradition, and the opportunity to use Europe as a
tool in creating domestic discipline and modernization (Dyson and Featherstone,
pp. 62-64, 1999). Obviously the French favored to proceed immediately with EMU
while  according  to  them  this  had  to  be  seen  as  the  first  step  in  reaching
economic  convergence  fixing  the  fundamental  asymmetry  in  the  burdens  of
monetary  integration (Moravcsik,  pp.  ,1995).  Even though the Franco-German
solidarity  was  obvious  because  of  their  cooperation  in  the  EMS  initiative,
Moravcsik (1995) stated that it helped disguise a “fundamental asymmetry in the
burdens of monetary integration”. It came down to the fact that the EMS favored
the countries with a strong currency, like Germany, and placed the burden on the
countries with weak currencies, like France. The varying effect the EMS had on
France  and  Germany  led  to  a  firm  disagreement  between  the  two.  Schmidt
favored a system under which bilateral intervention in the exchange rate system
was  necessary.  According  to  Moravcsik  (1995)  this  system  led  to
“disproportionate burdens” on weak currencies (devaluation) while it appeared to
impose “symmetrical  obligations.” This system preferred by Germany laid the
foundation for the EMS. The French government under  Valéry Giscard d'Estaing
(1974-1981)  on the contrary was in support of a system in which the national
currencies  would  be  pegged  to  a  ‘basket  unit’,  the  ECU.  Where  the  German
system  implied  symmetrical  obligations  but  actually  led  to  disproportionate
effects,  the  system  preferred  by  France  seemed  asymmetrical,  because  of
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unilateral intervention, but led to proportionate effects for as well the weak as
the  strong  currencies.  The  EMS  was  based  on  leadership  of  the  strongest
currency, which at the time was the Deutschmark. “Officially no currency was
designated as an anchor.  However, the Deutschmark and the Bundesbank were
unquestionably  the  center  of  the  EMS:  all  other  currencies  followed  its  lead.
Monetary cooperation became closer, and links between National Central Banks
were strengthened. Internal and external monetary stability became important
goals. Domestic economic policies were instrumental in achieving exchange rate
stability.  Countries  with  relatively  high  inflation  found  it  easier  to  pursue
disinflation  policies.  This  fostered  a  downward  convergence  of  inflation  rates,
reduced  excessive  exchange  rate  volatility,  and  promoted  trade  and  an
improvement in overall economic performance. Capital controls were gradually
relaxed (Paolo Mongelli, pp. 9-18 ,2008). 
However, the lack of fiscal convergence and symmetry remained a problem as
some countries continuously ran large budget deficits (Paolo Mongelli, pp. 9-18,
2008). It came down to the fact that countries that were unwilling to follow the
German  policy  focused  on  price  stability  and  disinflationary  measures  were
forced into repeated devaluation (Issing, pp. 3-10, 2010). “Under this system,
there was no other alternative than to align monetary policy with the Bundesbank
or  to  devalue  from  time  to  time  one’s  own  currency”  (Issing,  2008).  The
memorandum from the French members of the Monetary Committee (February
10th 1987) supports this fact. It argued that: “the EMS has not succeeded in the
implementation of a common policy towards third currencies, it has been no more
successful in avoiding the reef of asymmetry by which the burden of adjustment
and settlement in cash falls automatically on the countries whose currencies are
weakest. The EMS has a value, but it is inadequate and it in fact conceals the lack
of  an  effective  common  procedure  for  examining  the  coherence  and  the
compatibility of economic policies with each other”. The continuing loss of French
economic competitiveness and capital outflows continuously put strong pressure
on  the  French  Franc.  This  increased  interest  rates  and  the  number  of
devaluations. In March 1983 Mitterrand decided that it was enough. France would
stay in the EMS but from then on drastically change its economic policy to avoid
further devaluations. This policy was also called the "politique de rigueur" (Maes,
pp. 2-8, 2002). Mitterrand's policy shift was perceived as a ‘U-turn decision’ but
actually  represented  an  ongoing  reforms  process  already  initiated  under  his
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predecessors  (Bernhard,  2002).  “By the mid 1980’s,  French policymakers had
abolished their  system of  credit  controls  and established broader and deeper
financial markets, culminating with the adoption of monetary policy mechanisms
based  on  indirect  instruments  designed  to  influence  interest  rates”  (Loriaux,
1991).  Meanwhile  the  French  kept  complaining  about  the  Bundesbank’s  low
inflation policy, in 1987 the French Finance Minister Edouard Balladur argued for
further institutional changes that led to the nonbinding Basel-Nyborg accords. “As
in  earlier  negotiations,  the  French  wanted  reforms  that  would  distribute  the
burdens  of  policy  adjustment  more  symmetrically  among  countries  with
appreciating and depreciating currencies. It called for a multilateral obligation to
engage in foreign-exchange market intervention before currencies reached their
fluctuation margins” (Walsh, 2001). The Basle-Nyborg agreement decreased the
asymmetry of the EMS intervention mechanism by expanding credit facilities but
did not include provisions for more required intervention, greater surveillance, or
use of a divergence indicator. “The Bundesbank sought to offset the risks to price
stability  by  institutionalizing  the  practice  of  preventing  realignments  from
compensating for inflation differentials and pledging non-intervention on behalf of
overvalued  currencies.  The  Bundesbank’s  countermeasures  neutralized  hopes
that reforms could sufficiently remedy the asymmetry” (Staal, pp. 31, 1999). 
With regard to the EMS there were only three options open according to Staal (pp.
4 ,1999). It could be abandoned all together, it could be reformatted or it could
be  transformed.  While  the  costs  for  achieving  currency  and  exchange-rate
stability had been enormous, the European member states were not eager to
abandon  the  EMS.   Also  this  would  mean  a  deadlock  on  further  European
integration. Therefore the decision was made to reform the EMS, this happened
under French leadership.  In 1988 a political debate started on  the role of the
German Bundesbank in the EMS. It brought the political aspects of monetary and
exchange rate management into the limelight. The Germans were aware of the
political fact that they could not maintain their dominant monetary position over
France and the other member states for long. Various reforms of the EMS did not
solve the asymmetry due to the Bundesbank’s low-inflation policy. In a speech in
January 1988, the German minister of  foreign affairs,  Hans Dietrich Genscher,
acknowledged that “without new institutional precautions the scope for reform of
the EMS was small” (Staal, pp. 31 ,1999).  According to the Germans EMU had the
power to  eliminate the pressure for appreciation and the asymmetry. However,
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there  had to  be  institutional  guarantees  against  inflation:  above  all  sufficient
economic convergence and central bank independence. These were two of the
most  important  bargaining  points  during  the  Maastricht  Intergovernmental
Conference  (IGC)  on  EMU  which  was  initiated  by  France  in  advance  of  the
December 1989 Strasbourg summit on the completion of the Single European Act
and  which  was  formally  accepted  during  the  Strasburg  summit.  The  French
statement was the following: “France has already offered its contribution, namely
through  the  liberalization  of  capital  flows  and through  acknowledgement  and
acceptance of the leading role of the Deutschmark and the German orientation of
price stability and independence” (Staal, pp. 31 ,1999). So France was willing to
remain within the EMS but it wanted clarity on the monetary future for the burden
it carried to tackle domestic inflation.  “Insofar, the 1988 political debate was a
conspicuous  precursor  to  important  issues  which  later  on  were  intensely
discussed in connection with the Delors Report and during the IGC on EMU which
began in December 1990” (Ungerer, pp. 6, 1995).  
Germany and France agreed upon the fact that German unification had to be
reached  parallel to European unification. During the European Council meeting of
June 1988 the Council appointed a special committee chaired by Jacques Delors,
President of the Commission. The task of the committee was to present the path
to monetary union. The committee published its report in April  1989. Next to
Delors the governors and presidents of twelve national central banks, one extra
member  of  the  Commission  and  three  independent  experts  took  part  in  the
committee. According to Ungerer (pp. 3, 1995) “the decision to have top central
bankers  form  the  core  of  the  committee  was  significant  and  in  large  part
determined not  only  the  results  of  the  committee's  work  but  also  the  future
discussions and negotiations about the nature of the intended monetary union.”
Especially the presence of Karl Otto Pöhl, the President of the Bundesbank at the
Madrid Council in June 1989, was very important. At Madrid the Delors Report
was accepted by the European Council as the guiding document in the process
towards EMU. The Delors Report laid  down the format of the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty:  “A three-stage process leading to a single  currency and designing the
corresponding institutions was completely mapped out at the end of the decade”
(Paolo Mongelli, pp. 9-18, 2008). The European Council agreed that the first stage
toward the realization of EMU would start on July 1st 1990, parallel to the deadline
for  the  liberalization  of  capital  movements;  and  requested  the  assigned
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committee to start the preparatory activities for the IGC on the fixation of the
starting dates of phase two and three of EMU.
3.2 The EMU negotiations
The irrevocability of EMU
November  16th 1989  marked  one  of  the  greatest  events  in  modern  German
history;  the collapse of  the Berlin  wall.  With it  came the prospect of  German
unification.  From  this  moment  on  Germany’s  ‘economist’  political  economic
position in  EMU negotiations  suddenly  shifted   towards  the traditional  French
‘monetary view’, at least in terms of EMU’s transitional provisions. Originally, the
German preference was not to fix a timeframe for EMU but to link monetary union
to the progress in economic convergence. This shift in fact indicates a causal
linkage  between  the  EMU  negotiation  process  and  the  changes  in  German
monetary preferences which is, unlike the previous sub-paragraph, not covered
by Moravcsik’s theory (1998). Sandholtz (1993) and Baun (1995) on the other
hand do offer an explanation for this shift in Germany’s negotiation position. They
argue that  the prospect  of  German unification had a crucial  influence on the
negotiations  on  the  establishment  of  EMU while  Germany had to  give  up  its
D-Mark in return for French agreement upon the German unification. Also Szász
claims that Kohl privately announced that EMU offered Germany no benefits but
that agreement upon it was a necessary concession. A good relationship with its
neighbors was crucial with the prospect of German unification.  According to Kohl,
German unity and European integration were two sides of the same medal (2001,
pp. 169).  The German Weekly, Der Spiegel (2010), wrote:  “The Chancellor of
unity  gave  up  the  mark  in  favor  of  the  euro,  much  earlier  and  under  other
conditions than he had ever planned and not even for unification, but only for the
vague hope of a German-German confederation.” At the time, Germany was not
ready  for  EMU  and  it  offered  no  direct  monetary  benefits  for  the  country.
According to the Bundesbank in general and Waigel and Pöhl in particular, the
progress in economic convergence was not sufficient in order to proceed with
monetary integration. Schlesinger was doubtful that two such large projects as
German unification and EMU could realistically be undertaken at once. Tietmeyer
could see the linkage between German unification and political union but he was
reluctant about the connection to EMU. He argued: “To use German unification to
accelerate EMU is potentially irresponsible. Taking risks with price stability is not
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in the best interest of integrating Germany into Europe. It involves a misordering
of priorities” (Dyson and Featherstone, pp. 390-391, 1999). While their priority
was the protection of price-stability  by pressing for a ‘German style’ monetary
and budgetary policy. they were not open to concessions. For Kohl and Genscher
on the other hand, German isolation within Europe seemed like a undesirable
real-time possibility which they wanted to avoid at all costs.  Kohl was aware of
the European anxiety about German motives. Moderation was vital if Germany
was to build Europe on a basis of reassuring Germany’s suspicious neighbors.
Regarding EMU, to Kohl it was very important to take French susceptibilities as “a
proud  and  wounded  European  power”  seriously  (Dyson  and  Featherstone,
363-364,  1999).  Genscher  and  Kohl  were  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  France
wanted the guarantee that  EMU would be irrevocable.  “Also  German national
political-economic interests required an irreversible process of EMU, but Kohl’s
conception of irreversibility was essentially philosophical and historical and did
not extend to an interest in its precise legal implications and forms in EC law”
(Dyson and Featherstone, pp. 261, 370, 1999). On November 27th 1989 Kohl sent
Mitterrand a letter containing a proposition regarding a mutual Franco-German
timeframe starting right after the Strasbourg summit. The letter was focused on
taking  the  irrevocable  steps  towards  EMU  as  favored  by  France.   Joachim
Bitterlich, Kohl’s national security advisor, stated that to Mitterrand everything
was completely subordinate to EMU and from Mitterrand’s perspective, “France
already contributed more than its share already while the blueprint for EMU, as
presented in the Delors Report, was already very ‘German in nature’. It contained
initiatives  for  an  independent  central  bank,  focus  on  price-stability  and  strict
convergence-criteria  on  budget-discipline  and  public  debt.  Also,  during  the
1980’s, France had agreed upon capital liberalization against its will. Moreover,
according to Mitterrand it was time to act” (Segers and Van Riel, 2012). France
stated only to accept the ‘German blueprint’ of EMU if it could be certain of the
fact that EMU would be implemented (Segers and Van Riel,  2012). So France
considered  this  term,  unlike  the  terms  on  monetary  and  budgetary  content,
non-negotiable. “They did not wanted to be confronted with a hurdle race (the
convergence criteria) without a finish ” (Van Riel, 1999, pp. 222-223). Rejecting
the French term on fixed transitional provisions would lead to a huge conflict with
France, something that Kohl wanted to avoid.  “The prospects for German unity
supplied the Frenchman the long awaited means of pressure to extort from the
German the necessary yes for monetary union and shake off the predominance of
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the German Bundesbank.” (Der Spiegel, 2010). Therefore, at both the Rome and
Maastricht summits, Kohl outvoted the preference of the German delegation and
agreed upon the fixed transitional provisions for EMU. 
In the spring of 1990 Kohl declared to Mitterrand that he would truly support EMU
during the upcoming Rome summit late 1990. He did not wanted anyone to think
that he favored German integration before European integration. However, Kohl
waited until after the German elections before he gave his permission to fix the
starting date of the second phase of EMU. After Kohl won the elections already in
October 1990 he declared to the Italian presidency of the Council that Germany
was ready to thigh itself to EMU. This led to a break-through in the negotiations
concerning the starting date of phase two of EMU that almost reached a deadlock
in the past months. Against the will of the Bundesbank Kohl agreed to fix the
starting date of phase two on January 1st 1994 against ‘mild conditions’. However,
he refused to fix the establishment of the ECB on the same date. A year later, at
the December 1991 Maastricht summit, Kohl again made a sole decision to fix
the starting date of phase three of EMU making it irrevocable. Kohl stated he
would not sign the Treaty if it did not include a provision on the irrevocability of
EMU, however, while Kohl could not count on the support of the Bundesbank, the
German  delegation  could  not  come  up  with  proposals  of  its  own.  When  in
November 1991 it became clear that the IGC on Political Union was doomed to
fail it became even more important for Kohl to establish EMU irrevocably. To Kohl
EMU was not only a goal on itself but also a way to deepen European integration
which he considered necessary to secure German Unification.  The decision to
agree upon the starting date for phase three of EMU was not without domestic
political risk due to the opposition of the Bundesbank. However, to Kohl the risk
of  German  isolation  in  Europe  or  the  rise  of  anti-German  sentiment  after
unification seemed worse to him (Van Riel and Metten, 2000).  
The former President of the German Bundesbank, Pöhl, argued: “Möglicherweise
wäre  die  Europäische  Währungsunion  gar  nicht  zustande  gekommen  ohne
deutsche Einheit.” Kohl knew that if he wanted to create European acceptance for
the German Unification he had to put Europe first, claimed Hubert Védrine, one of
Mitterrand’s advisors at the time.  Bernd Pfaffenbach, at that time a member of
Kohl’s Kanzleramt, argues that at first the German preference was to create EPU
before EMU, however, during the bargaining process it had given in to the French
preference of a reversed order. It was a political deal of which Mitterrand and Kohl
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both profited. Mitterrand was prepared to wait until after the German elections
with the negotiations on fixing the starting date of the second phase of EMU. This
in return gave Kohl the opportunity to become the Chancellor of the new united
Germany and to tie Germany to EMU, which in return was a great victory for
Mitterrand (Der Spiegel, 2010).
Franco-German reconciliation 
According to Baun (1995) Germany was in favor of a deepening and widening of
the European Community. In contrary to what Moravcsik’s theory (1998) argues,
the German incentives behind favoring European integration had their basis also
in  fundamental  geopolitical  interests.  The immediate  concerns of  the German
government at  the time were targeted at the fear of  its  neighbors,  France in
particular (Baun,  pp. 606-614, 1995).  Therefore Kohl  was determined to show
that German Unification and European integration were compatible rather than
conflicting.  “Kohl  placed a  high priority  on maintaining positive  relations with
France as the basis for Germany’s European policy (Sandholtz, pp. 1-41, 1993). 
Recently  published  German  reports  on  conversations  between  Kohl  and
Mitterrand indicate that Kohl was already sensitive to the French doubts about
German  linkage  to  Europe  before  the  collapse  of  the  Berlin  wall.  With  the
prospect of German Unification in the near future these doubts increased. Already
at an early stage the German government perceived the French fair as a serious
matter. In the light of the German Unification it became more and more important
for  Kohl  to  eliminate the French doubts on German linkage to Europe and to
prevent German isolation. So when the collapse of the Berlin wall became more
and more  evident  Kohl  adapted  his  strategy rigorous  in  pro-EMU direction  in
reaction to French hints  and Bitterlich’s  advises.  The week in  advance of  the
collapse Kohl made his first concessions towards France. He ignored the advice
given by his ministers Waigel and Genscher while according to Kohl this was a
matter of direct contact between Elysée and the Bundeskanzleramt. This pro-EMU
strategy was completed already in advance of  the December 1989 Strasburg
summit  (Correspondence  Segers  and  Van  Riel,  October  2011).  France  was
reluctant on Kohl’s attempts to seize the initiative on German unification in the
context of his Ten-points-plan, concerning a decade long process of unification,
and  his  unwillingness  to  offer  final  consent  on  the  Oder-Neisse  border  with
Poland.  The  reason  behind  Kohl’s  behavior  was  his  fear  of  being  overrun  by
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events  and  other  politicians.  He  expected  this  was  understood  by  France.
Therefore Kohl could not understand why Mitterrand was complaining about Bonn
losing its interest in pressing ahead with EMU while Kohl had already agreed upon
the convention of the IGC on stage two of  EMU during the Italian Presidency.
Mitterrand stated: “In the context of preparing the Strasbourg Council, Germany
seemed  to  have  emerged  as  a  brake  on  the  European  unification  process.
Without parallel progress on EC unification and German unification a return to the
former  balance  of  power  politics  could  occur”  (Dyson  and  Featherstone,  pp.
236-245, 363-366, 1999). This created even stronger incentive for Genscher to fix
the IGC date at the Strasbourg Council in December 1989.
Mitterrand’s unease was seen as having its main roots in the perceived threat to
French interests and power in Europe from a unified Germany. According to Baun
(pp. 606-614, 1995), France had the feeling it had too little influence on the end
of  the  cold  war.  It  was  not  only  afraid  of  the  fact  that  Germany,  after  its
unification would be larger than France, also the end of the cold war implicated a
removal of international constraints on Germany’s sovereignty which gave France
important advantages in its bilateral relations with Germany. Baun (pp. 62-613,
1995) also argued: “ the shift from a security order dominated by military power
and concerns to one based on economics favored the German civilian power over
the French nuclear state. To compensate for these developments, France sought a
deepening  of  Community  structures,  which  would  allow  it  to  retain  some
influence and control over Germany. Besides, France feared that a Community
that neglected further integration and remained instead a simple trading block
would be more capable of being dominated by Germany in the future. In such a
Community, France’s own national standing would be even further diminished”.
According  to  Dyson  and  Featherstone  (pp.  64,  257,  1999),  Franco-German
reconciliation was one of the main determents of the French negotiation position
on EMU. “It was ultimately the decisive factor at work.” The French humiliation by
German  power  was  the  historic  factor  that  troubled  the  French  the  most.
According to the French this power had to be neutralized by harnessing it into the
construction  of  a  united  Europe,  via  power  sharing  in  common  European
institutions.  “To  ensure  the  defense  of  French  interests  in  this  process  of
European unification it was essential that France assume the role of leadership in
the  building  of  Europe  and  harness  Franco-German  reconciliation  for  that
purpose.”  For  Germany  the  French  fear  regarding  the  Eastern  European
26 26
developments could have negative consequences with regard to its position in
EMU negotiations, especially when the German Unification would run parallel to
the French presidency in the Council. Therefore it was of utmost importance for
Germany to obtain more influence in EMU developments, especially because EMU
was an unpopular theme within German domestic politics. Kohl had to convince
France of  its  sincere intentions without  looking shady in front  of  the national
public.  Therefore  Bitterlich  linked  the  idea  of  a  future  Political  Union  to  the
negotiations  on  EMU,  this  could  count  on  great  German  domestic  support,
especially  when  it  would  be  linked  to  more  rights  and  competences  for  the
European Parliament (Segers and Van Riel, 2012). 
In  preparation  of  the  Strasbourg  Council  Kohl  sent  a  letter  to  Mitterrand
containing the proposal for an IGC on political union as a means of countering the
concerns about German unification that were likely to figure at the center of the
Strasbourg Council deliberations (Dyson and Featherstone, pp. 236-245, 363-366,
1999). By sending this letter Kohl tried to avoid German isolation in Europe and at
the same time convince Mitterrand of the depth of his commitment to European
unification.  Mitterrand  however  replied  that  political  union  was  not  the  top
priority, even though desirable. The top priority was to set a fixed date for the
IGC on stage two of EMU, Kohl agreed on this,  convening the IGC during the
Italian Presidency.   The Strasbourg Council  was a big success for the German
Foreign Ministry. It gained clear agreement of support for German unification tied
to the perspective of European unification. Prove of this support was shown by
the fixed date for the IGC on the second stage of EMU. Strasbourg also gave Kohl
a strengthened incentive in reaffirming German ambitions to give a new impulse
to European unification. “In its wake Kohl determined to make EMU his personal
responsibility; to wrap it up in a refashioned vision of Germany and Europe in the
context  of  German  unification;  and  to  make  it  the  focus  of  his  European
leadership”  (Dyson  and  Featherstone,  pp.  257-266,  1999).  When  Mitterrand
pressed for bringing forward the date for the IGC on EMU, Kohl used this demand
to press for an IGC on political union. According to him an accelerated process of
European unification of which EMU was a part was vital. Mitterrand agreed on
this, showing that a more positive factor was at work between the two nations
(Dyson and Featherstone, pp. 236-245, 363-366, 1999).
Monetary power
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Traditionally France as well as Germany craved global power. This was also the
case in European monetary integration and reflected in their support for EMU
(Loedel, 1995; Feldstein, 1997). France saw EMU and the stronger political union
to which EMU would lead as an opportunity for France to be a "co-manager" of
Europe as an equal to Germany rather than being dominated by a Germany as
was the case during the EMS (Dyson and Featherstone, pp. 63, 1999). According
to  the  French  the  domination  of  European  monetary  policy  by  the  German
Bundesbank would be replaced by the European Central Bank at which Germany
and France  would  sit  and  vote  as  equals.  French  officials  argued that  France
would benefit more from monetary union and the political evolution that would
follow than  from the  continuation  of  the EMS in  which  the burdens  of  policy
adjustment were divided asymmetrically among countries with appreciating and
depreciating currencies (Feldstein,  pp.  11-14,  1997).  “French enthusiasm, with
Italian support, for a single currency reflected the distaste for their relative loss of
sovereignty  and  preference  for  power  sharing.  According  to  Dyson  and
Featherstone (pp. 97, 1999) “Most important as a French motive for EMU were
considerations of international and European monetary power. It was in France’s
vital interest to shield its economy from the negative effects of irresponsible US
and  German  monetary  policies.  EMU  offered  France  the  opportunity  to
re-establish influence over monetary policy by Europeanizing it.” This European
system  could  then  be  used  to  shift  economic  objectives  in  a  manner  more
compatible  with  the  French  domestic  economic  incentives,  and  to  achieve
international  monetary  reform.  As  mentioned  before,  Germany  wanted,  via
monetary union, to eliminate the imported inflation characteristics of the ERM
and maintain dominant within monetary policy. The domestic political economic
objectives  of  the parties  thus were  mutually  inconsistent”  (Nobay,  pp.  11-16,
2011).  However,  both  visions  of  the  monetary  future  drove  their  leaders  to
support the pursuit of EMU (Feldstein, pp. 5-9, 1997). Loedel (1995) argued: “the
willingness of the Germans to offer concessions on domestic monetary autonomy
to their European partners was the opportunity to export monetary stability to
the EU and develop a European zone of monetary power and influence in global
monetary affairs. In this sense, a comprehensive account of the Maastricht treaty
must include the international level factors that played a role in the negotiations
surrounding Maastricht.” The Germans were not attracted by the idea of losing
monetary autonomy, however, the loss of autonomy was overshadowed by the
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desire  to  secure  an  absolute  sense  of  power  in  global  monetary  affairs.  The
Germans and the French could realize their desire to enhance the community's
monetary  influence  in  world  politics  by  enhancing  exchange  rate  stability  in
Europe.
3.3 After Maastricht
According to the Treaty of Maastricht an early start of  EMU in 1997 would be
possible  if  a  majority  of  the  member  states  would  have  lived  up  to  the
convergence criteria as set in the Treaty (European Union, 1992). The original
Maastricht  convergence  criteria  (1992)  were  based  upon  Robert  Mundell’s
‘rationale  of  optimum  currency  areas’  (pp.  657-665,  1961).  The  goal  of  the
criteria at the time was to sustain the European Union in the future. At the time,
as well  Germany as France were reluctant of  some member states,  like Italy,
directly participating in EMU  while they doubted if these member states were
able  to  meet  the  agreed  convergence  criteria.  However,  if  the  original
convergence criteria were the only criteria to be met in order to participate, a lot
of countries would be able to in 1999 or maybe even sooner. During the EMU
negotiation period, before 1992, the plan was to start stage three in 1997 with a
head-group  of  countries  exclusively  meeting  ‘stricter  criteria  with  regard  to
excessive deficits’ (Cameron, pp. 455-485, 1997). During the negotiations it was
expected  that  compliance  with  these  criteria  would  not  cause  Germany  and
France any trouble. The German inflation- and interest rates would form the basis
for the assessment of the other member states at this point. The French interest
rate  would  decline,  after  decreasing  the  gap  between  German  and  French
inflation rates, until it was only marginally above the German interest rate. Both
countries  had,  during  the  EMU  negotiation  on  convergence  criteria,  a  low
government deficit and debt compared to the other member states (Van Riel and
Metten,  2000).  However,  an  early  start  in  1997  was  prevented  by  the
Franco-German failure to comply with the convergence criteria, especially with
regard to the excessive deficit. When the government deficit and debt of as well
Germany as  France rose  in  the  first  phase  of  EMU it  became doubtful  if  the
initiators of EMU their selves could live up to the criteria. Between 1995 and 1996
both countries maintained a government deficit of more than three percent. In
the following years they succeeded in decreasing their rates till they were less
than  three  percent.  However,  the  French  debt  rate,  which  was  relatively  low
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before 1990, increased dramatically in short notice. This was also the case for
Germany. In 1998 the German debt rate even exceeded the sixty percent criteria.
In  1997  Germany  and  France  were  the  only  member  states  in  which  the
government deficit, excluding the interest payments, was insufficient to stabilize
the government debt (Van Riel and Metten, 2000). During the Cannes European
Council in June 1995 and the Madrid Council six months later, it was decided to
move  to  stage  three  only  by  January  1st,  1999.  During  the  Dublin  European
Council in December 1996 the Stability Pact was introduced in order to create
fiscal  responsibility  among  the  participants  (Cameron,  pp.  455-485,  1997).
Between 1996 and 1999 there remained a lot of unresolved issues with regard to
the  transition  to  stage  three.  One  of  these  issues  was  the  question  which
countries would be able to meet the convergence criteria by January 1st 1999 in
order to participate in stage three. It was highly doubtful if Germany (and France)
would be one of  those counties.  That is  why early 1997 the tone of  German
officials  regarding  the  strict  criteria  on  deficit  and  debt  reference  values
changed. In 1996 the predominant view was that Germany could not enter the
third  stage  of  EMU  if  it  did  not  met  the  criteria,  by  March  1997  it  became
apparent that stage three of EMU would start either way at January 1 st 1999.
Germany  stepped  away  from  its  demand  on  stricter  criteria  on  excessive
governmental debt and budgetary deficit. This led to a change in the vision that
stage  three  of  EMU would  only  include  a  head-group  of  countries,  excluding
others, like Italy. Stage three of EMU, or the start-up phase, would now become a
broad  start  including  also  countries  that  before  1992  were  perceived  as  the
‘weaker countries’ by Germany and France (Cameron, pp. 455-485, 1997).
The primary reasons for the increased German government debt were the costs
involved with the unification in 1989, which increased the structural government
deficit.  Van  Riel  and  Metten  (2000)  consider  it  remarkable  that  the  German
government was not able to reverse the increasing trend of its deficit. This vision
is supported by Gros (2014) “By 1992 there had not been any change in parity
‘realignment’ since 1987, although prices and wage competitiveness indicators
had diverged considerably between Germany and its main partners. At the same
time, Germany experienced considerable inflationary pressures in the aftermath
of the boom created by unification.” During the Economic and Financial Council of
Ministers (Ecofin-Council) on the first German convergence program held in May
1992 it became clear that the German Unification caused an enormous shock to
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the German government’s financial position. The Ecofin-Council considered the
increasing deficit to be a natural consequence under the current circumstances.
According to the convergence program the German deficit should be decreased
to less than two percent by 1995, however, soon it became clear that this target
would not be reached in time. In 1993 Waigel informed his colleagues in Brussels
that Germany needed more time to consolidate its financial position. This was the
first time that doubts were expressed publicly concerning the early start of EMU.
The  French  government  deficit  started  increasing  later,  after  the  1992-1993
recession. In 1992 the public opinion on the French financial position was very
positive, France complied with all convergence criteria. It was expected that the
government deficit would rise to two percent in 1993, however in 1993 it became
publically known that without additional measures the French government deficit
would run up to six percent in 1994. At the Cannes summit in June 1995 the
French president Jacques Chirac proposed the official initiative to postpone the
EMU’s starting date, his proposal was officially accepted at the Madrid summit in
December  1995.  During  the  Ecofin-Council  on  the  first  French  convergence
program held in November 1993 it became clear that the French deficit increased
because of the effects of the French market conditions. The main factors behind
the increasing deficit were the expansive French budgetary policy, because of
lower taxes and increased spending, and the fact that the French offered the
automatic  stabilizers  in  their  financial  estimate the possibility  to  increase the
deficit. The French maintained their expansive budgetary policy until 1995 as a
counterweight to their monetary policy which, because of the linkage with the
German Deutschmark, was obliged to follow the Bundesbank’s restrictive policy
(Van Riel and Metten, 2000). 
4. Conclusion
 “In  which  capacity  and  to  what  extend  has  the  1989  German  Unification
influenced the Maastricht negotiations up till the establishment of EMU in 1999?” 
Moravcsik (1998) and Staal (1999) both claim that the German unification had
no,  or  marginal  influence  at  most,  on  the  establishment  of  the  European
monetary union while EMU was built upon the basis of national political-economic
preferences. They both claim, correctly, that EMU was put back on the European
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agenda before of the collapse of  the Berlin  Wall.  This was mainly due to the
stability of the Franco-German traditional economic views, flaws in the EMS and
spill-over from the SEA. In my opinion, it can be therefore considered assumable
that national political-economic preferences were main drivers behind  the first
phase of EMU. However, their argumentations are insufficiently adaptive to the
period  from 1989  forward  while  with  the  prospect  of  German  unification  the
geopolitical  aspects  started  to  play  a  crucial  role  in  EMU  negotiations.  The
long-standing stability of Germany’s economic view broke down to make room for
the, at that moment, more pressing geopolitical issue of unification. The French
on their turn, used this momentum in order to press for EMU, driven mainly by
Eastern developments and its fear of German unification. 
When German unification became a short term reality, France put more pressure
on Germany to start EMU negotiations on phase two and three. Germany agreed
upon  the  French  irrevocability  demand,  which  found  its  basis  in  national
political-economic preferences, in order to safeguard its unification. EPU, in this
context,  was  a  German  demand  in  order  to  gain  national  public  support  for
agreement  upon  EMU  and  eventually  French  support  for  German  unification.
France  in  its  turn  only  agreed upon the  acceleration of  EPU in  order  to  gain
German agreement on EMU’s irrevocability, indicating that the trade-off of as well
national political-economic but mainly geopolitical concessions was the driving
force behind EMU’s negotiation process. Claims as posed by Baun (pp. 606-614,
1995) and Sandholtz (pp. 1-41, 1993) that EMU only finds its basis in geopolitical
factors  are  therefore  much too  simplistic.  Also,  the  fact  that  Germany  made
concessions regarding the transitional provisions does not implicate that it did
not  benefitted  from  EMU  at  all,  while  the  blueprint  for  EMU  was  definitely
German. It can therefore not be claimed that Germany gave away its D-Mark in
return  for  agreement  upon  its  unification.  Overall,  it  can  be  assumed  that
geopolitical factors in general, and the German unification specifically, played a
dominant  role  in  the  1989  EMU  negotiation.  The  national  political-economic
preferences of France and Germany were present at this point, but of subordinate
importance. 
Also, the German unification had a major influence on the start-up phase of EMU
with  regard  to  an  accelerated  start  of  phase  three  and  the  number  of
participating  countries.  This  impact  only  became  clear  after  the  negotiation
process  had  ended  and  the  terms  on  the  original  timeline  and  start-up  had
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already been agreed upon. The German unification influenced Germany’s position
in  such  a  way  that   it  had  to  change  its  original,  pre  1992,  vision  on  an
accelerated start of stage three of EMU in 1997 only including a head-group of
countries  into a vision including agreement upon a broad start  at  January 1 st
1999, two years later than originally anticipated. 
The conclusion I draw regarding this research is that it cannot be argued that
either the national political-economic or geopolitical preferences were the sole
determents of the establishment of EMU. Moreover it was the correlation of these
incentives  in  the  historical  context  of  the  EMS  and  the  context  of  German
unification  which  triggered  France  and  Germany  to  make  the  concessions
necessary  to  reach  agreement  upon  EMU’s  blueprint  and  its  transitional
provisions. The relative importance of the preferences within this correlation may
be subject to further research.
1. EMU would have been established without the prospect of German unification
while the establishment of EMU solely depended on national political-economic
preferences.
2.  The  establishment  of  EMU  would  have  reached  a  deadlock  without  the
prospect of German unification.
With regard to the hypotheses, if the negotiations on EMU would have reached a
deadlock without the prospect of German unification remains a difficult question
to  answer.  While  the  traditional  national  political-economic  preferences
surrounding  EMU  deferred  a  great  deal  between  both  countries  it  can  be
reasoned  assumable  that  the  negotiations  surrounding  EMU  would  have
stagnated at some point. The concessions in the context of German unification
led to an accelerated start  of  EMU. However, it  surely is possible that if   the
unification  of  Germany  had  not  occurred  at  that  specific  time,  the  national
political-economic  preferences  would  have  been  sufficient  to  lead  to  the
establishment  of  EMU.  The  time-span  however,  could  have  been a  whole  lot
longer. 
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